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INTRODUCTION 
1. SUMMARY 
For over a decade and recently as a means to overcome the crippling effects of the credit crunch 
and its recessionary effects on European economies, EU institutions have initiated an expansive 
innovation policy centered on the development and support of entrepreneurs and emerging 
growth ventures. Private investment in the form of venture capital (VC) is necessary to support 
this policy in that the VC market provides a unique and essential link between finance and 
innovation. Tax incentives, tax treatment, and legal (tax) certainty are of paramount importance 
in both attracting entrepreneurs as well as driving the financial commitments of reputable VC 
funds. The high level of risk that an entrepreneurial “idea”, emerging growth venture, or start-up 
will never be commercialized demands both tax incentives for risk-taking as well as confidence 
that an investor’s exit from a VC investment will not be subjected to unfavorable tax treatment. 
Thus, in that cross-border investment is often considered necessary for VC funds to achieve 
required economies of scale in the EU, the creation of a robust VC industry demands that the risk 
of double taxation in cross-border investments is eliminated. At the EU-level, this risk can be 
immediately addressed only through the collective will(s) of the Member States as manifested in 
secondary legislation. Otherwise, in light of the ECJ’s 2006 decision in Kerckhaert, the middling 
VC industry of the EU appears certain to confront the Member States’ unreliable coordination of 
their overlapping, autonomous taxing jurisdictions under a continuing shadow of double taxation 
uncertainty. 
2. AIM OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this thesis is to elucidate a primary hindrance to the successful implementation of the 
EU’s past and current innovation policies. First, the limitation on the ECJ’s competence to 
eliminate taxation disadvantages (including international double taxation) which result from 
“disparities” inherent in the concurrent taxation measures of differing Member States in cross-
border economic situations is explored. The ECJ’s case law which has established this limitation 
in competence and which culminated with Kerckhaert is assessed for its quality, consistency, and 
underlying legal certainty. Much emphasis is placed on the case law at the intersection of the free 
movement of capital and national direct taxation measures in that 1) Kerckhaert summarily put 
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an end to the question of whether the ECJ holds international double taxation to be 
discriminatory, and 2) the case law on capital movements is most illustrative of the Court’s 
deference to the Member States’ direct taxation autonomy.  
Additionally, the effectiveness of other EU institutions in driving innovation is addressed. In 
particular, methods of positive tax integration are considered and evaluated for their likelihood of 
successful implementation. In particular, non-taxation initiatives such as the Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive and the European Venture Capital Funds Regulation are 
analyzed and assessed. In sum, while the tone of the thesis may appear critical at times, the aim 
is merely to promote an awareness of the currently limited competences and abilities of the 
differing EU institutions to drive the highly ambitious goals of the EU’s innovation policy.  
3. METHOD AND MATERIALS 
Because of a personal interest in the reasons for the lack of an EU-wide VC industry to 
complement the EU’s innovation policy, research began with a close reading and analysis of 
Granieri and Renda’s Innovation Law and Policy in the European Union. Specifically, the thesis 
utilizes a traditional legal dogmatic approach to establish both the current state of the law at the 
EU level but also to analyze the competences and legal bases of the ECJ and other EU 
institutions to effect change. A vast array of highly conflicting legal commentary and criticism 
has been delivered in response to the ECJ’s line of cases which culminated with Kerckhaert. As 
such, this thesis in large part endeavors to synthesize this opposing scholarship and to utilize an 
accurate understanding of Kerckhaert to comment on the case’s potential effects on EU 
innovation policy. 
4. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
Part I of the thesis ventures to summarize the economic and legal dynamics of the virtuous 
venture capital cycle as they pertain to the goals of the EU’s innovation policy. Further, Part I 
introduces the reader to the role of bilateral double taxation conventions in the coordination of 
the Member States’ concurrent or “overlapping” taxing jurisdictions. Finally, Part I touches on 
the ECJ’s case law at the intersection of the free movement of capital and direct taxation 
measures. This case law is introduced to highlight its overarching relevance to the substantial 
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autonomy of the Member States to coordinate the allocation of taxing rights in cross-border VC 
investment. Subsequently, Part II of the thesis highlights key elements in the development of the 
free movement of capital. This historical analysis is meant to serve as a means for the reader to 
understand recent rulings of the ECJ at the intersection of capital movements and national direct 
taxation.  
Part III assesses, in detail, the development of the ECJ’s case law at the intersection of capital 
movements and national direct taxation. In particular, the ECJ’s utilizations of both the non-
discrimination and non-hindrance tests are addressed. Further, the Court’s attempts to delineate 
between discrimination and mere disparity as to Member State direct taxation measures are 
explored. Subsequently, Part IV further analyzes the ECJ’s application of its discrimination / 
disparity standard within the controversial line of cases which culminated with Kerckhaert. 
Finally, Part V addresses the post-Kerckhaert prospects for the relief of international double 
taxation in the EU. In particular, the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive as well as 
the European Venture Capital Funds Regulation are addressed.     
      
PART I – INNOVATION POLICY AND THE NEED FOR A VIRTUOUS 
VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE IN THE EU  
As what is arguably the deepest and most impactful economic crisis of modern times continues 
to permeate on a global scale, governments are desperate to foster economic recovery. 
Government policy toward “innovation” is currently a primary—if not nearly universal—means 
of attempting to spur economic growth and competitiveness.
1
 In 1934, Joseph Schumpeter 
defined innovation quite broadly as “the introduction of new goods, new methods of production, 
the opening of new markets, the conquest of new sources of supply, and the carrying out of a 
new organization of any industry.”2 More recently, the Alliance for Science & Technology 
Research in America defined innovation as “a process by which value is created for customers 
through public and private organizations that transform new knowledge and technologies into 
                                                          
1
 Massimiliano Granieri and Andrea Renda, Innovation Law and Policy in the European Union. Towards Horizon 
2020 (Springer-Verlag Italia 2012), pp 1-2. 
2
 Ibid, at 2; see also Joseph A. Schumpeter, The theory of economic development: an inquiry into profits, capital, 
credit, interest, and the business cycle. (Harvard University Press 1934). 
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profitable products and services for national and global markets.”3 Despite the lack of a 
commonly accepted definition (and there are many to choose from), there is a strong consensus 
as to the fact that innovation requires entrepreneurs and that the optimal vehicle of 
entrepreneurship is the small and medium enterprise (SME).
4
 Specifically, the SME—as opposed 
to larger, “track-dependent” firms bound by pre-existing business goals and methods—is 
considered to be ideally positioned for the successful development of high-risk, high-potential 
innovation.
5
 In fact, research has found that new, small firms—or “start-ups”—have developed 
more than half of the 20th century’s most important innovations.6 
Private investment in the form of venture capital (VC) is generally necessary to support 
and develop the innovative projects of SMEs.
7
 In this sense, the VC market provides a unique 
and essential link between finance and innovation.
8
 A viable VC market requires and coordinates 
the simultaneous availability of 1) entrepreneurs, 2) investors (typically passive limited partners) 
with an appetite for high-risk, high-return investments that place capital into funds, and 3) fund 
managers (general partners) that have the expertise to serve as “specialized financial 
intermediaries” between entrepreneurs and investors. The fund manager serves not only as a 
fundraiser, but is ultimately compensated for the ability to optimize the performance of the 
entrepreneurs or “portfolio companies” that are selected to compose the fund.9 Thus, VC 
investments can be defined as a subset of private equity that targets unlisted (non-public) 
companies for the launch, early development, or expansion of a business. The vast majority of 
the invested capital is in the form of equity—as opposed to debt—and during the period that the 
capital is at risk, the entrepreneur and fund manager will engage in an active partnership where 
each of the parties is fully incentivized to share each other’s respective expertise and align their 
intentions. With regard to this alignment of intentions, VC has no particular use for dividends; 
                                                          
3
 Granieri and Renda (n 1), at 2. 
4
 Josh Lerner, ‘Entrepreneurship, public policy, and cities’, Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 6880. 
Washington, DC: World Bank Group (2014) at 3. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. See also Zoltan J. Acs and David B. Audretsch ‘Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical 
Analysis’, American Economic Review 78: (1988) pp 678–90. 
7
 See Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Money of Invention, How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth, 
(Harvard Business School Press, 2001). 
8
 Ronald J. Gilson, ‘Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience’, Stanford Law 
Review, Vol. 55, (April 2003), at 1068; See also Samuel Kortum and Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of 
Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 Rand J. Econ. 674, (2000) at 674-75.   
9
 See Gilson (n 8), at 1093. 
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rather, investment returns are usually achieved in the form of capital gains at exit—that is, either 
when the company is listed on a stock market or when it is sold to another investor.
10
  
Thus, with regard to the policies and legislation crafted to remedy the “innovation 
emergency”11 faced by the European Union (EU), much emphasis has been placed on the 
establishment of what has been termed a “virtuous venture capital cycle”12 which focuses on 1) 
boosting VC fundraising (i.e., from large, institutional investors into VC funds), 2) promoting 
VC and other risk capital investments in promising, early-stage companies, and 3) encouraging 
access to capital markets in order to improve liquidity and exit opportunities that enable VC 
funds to return capital to their investors.
13
 Tax systems are of the highest importance in the 
promotion of this cycle in that particular systems directly affect decisions to enter into 
entrepreneurship, the demand for VC investments, and contracting between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs.
14
 Extensive research stresses that decreased rates of taxation for capital gains 
as well as favorable treatment for industry-standard stock options (e.g., convertible preferred 
stock) drive increases in committed capital to VC funds because of an increased demand for VC 
investments by entrepreneurs.
15
  
Currently, there is a strong consensus that the EU’s VC industry does not operate to its 
potential due to a fragmented internal market that 1) features 28 sets of tax, legal and regulatory 
systems and 2) obstructs the economies of scale necessary for effective, large-scale VC 
investments.
16
 The Council and the Commission have stressed that to establish an EU-wide VC 
market for the support of SMEs, there must be certainty that intra-EU, cross-border VC 
                                                          
10
 OECD (1996), Venture Capital and Innovation, at 22; available online at:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/59/2102064.pdf 
11
 See Granieri and Renda (n 1), at 53, citing to M´aire Geoghegan-Quinn, European Commissioner for Research, 
Innovation and Science “A Europe where we pull together, not drift apart”, Institute of International and European 
Affairs Brussels, 20 September 2011, SPEECH/11/592. 
12
 See Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, (The MIT Press, 1999). 
13
 Janke Dittmer, Joseph A. McCahery, and Erik P. M. Vermeulen, ‘The “New” Venture Capital Cycle and the Role 
of Governments: The Emergence of Collaborative Funding Models and Platforms’ (November 20, 2013). Lex 
Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2013-7; Tilburg Law School Research Paper 
No. 021/2013, at 9. 
14
 Josh Lerner and Joacim Tåg, ‘Instututions and Venture Capital’, IFN Working Paper No. 897, (2012) at 8. 
15
 Ibid. See also Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner, ‘What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?’, Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity—Microeconomics, (1998), 149–192; and Ronald J. Gilson and David Schizer (2003), 
‘Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock’, Harvard Law Review, 116 (2003) 
875–916. 
16
 Report of the Expert Group on removing tax obstacles to cross-border Venture Capital Investments (2010), at 4. 
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investments can be executed without disproportionate administrative burdens, unfavorable tax 
treatment, and—most importantly—incidences of double taxation.17 While the Member States 
rely almost exclusively on bilateral double taxation conventions or treaties (DTCs) between each 
other that are generally based on the Model Double Tax Convention of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (or the OECD Model), these DTCs are not always 
effective in the allocation of taxing rights among the Member States to avoid double taxation. 
First, the effectiveness of a DTC can be dubious in that the complex financing / partnership 
structures utilized in VC funds are not always recognized or accommodated by the DTC.
18
 
Second, there is often uncertainty as to whether the cross-border “management” of a portfolio 
company by the VC fund manager will be deemed by differing Member States’ tax authorities to 
have created a permanent establishment—and thus, an extra layer of taxation—for the fund’s 
investors and the fund vehicle itself. Notably, most DTCs contain a provision based on Article 5 
of the OECD Model that would enable investors and the fund vehicle to avoid their creation of a 
permanent establishment if the VC manager is deemed an “independent” rather than a 
“dependent” agent. Still, there is no accepted or harmonized position in the EU that the activities 
of a VC fund manager are such as to constitute independent agency.
19
 Third, and finally, the 
specific tax treatment of VC funds varies from one Member State to another.
20
 For example, in 
triangular or multi-angular tax situations where three or more Member States are involved in a 
VC investment (e.g., the state of establishment of the VC fund vehicle, the state of residence of 
investors, and the state of the portfolio companies in which the VC fund invests), double taxation 
may not be prevented by the DTCs because the respective tax authorities of the differing 
Member States may classify the VC fund in different ways (e.g., as transparent/non-transparent, 
resident/non-resident, subject to tax/not subject to tax and trading/non-trading).
21
  
As the European Court of Justice (ECJ) began its sudden effort to bring the case law on 
the free movement of capital broadly in conformity with the restrictions-based approach of the 
other Treaty freedoms, the Court specifically addressed “the vexed question of international 
                                                          
17
 Ibid.,at 1. 
18
 Ibid, at 1. 
19
 Ibid, pp 15-22. 
20
 Ibid, at 1.  
21
 Ibid, at 23. 
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double taxation” in the seminal 2006 case Kerckhaert.22 Before this case, the ECJ had begun 
aggressively applying to national measures—including taxation measures—a broad definition of 
what amounts to a restriction of the free movement of capital in utilizing language that focused 
on dissuading or deterring effects.
23
 Cases such as Sandoz and Manninen highlight the extent of 
the Court’s willingness to impinge on the fiscal / tax sovereignty of the Member States with 
broad, restriction-based language and analysis that seemed, at one point, to threaten the very core 
of international taxation law.
24
 In Manninen, AG Kokott’s opinion specifically argued that even 
in the context of direct taxation:  
[a]ny measure that makes the cross-border transfer of capital more difficult or less 
attractive and is thus liable to deter the investor constitutes a restriction on the free 
movement of capital. In this respect the concept of a restriction of capital 
movements corresponds to the concept of a restriction that the Court has 
developed with regard to the other fundamental freedoms.
25
  
Further, in his opinion to the 2005 case D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, AG Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer stated, “the fact that a taxable event might be taxed twice is the most serious obstacle 
there can be to people and their capital crossing internal borders.”26 Yet, in Kerckhaert, the ECJ 
distanced itself from this position and what was for many the most intriguing question with 
regard to the application of the free movement of capital to direct taxation was settled: 
international double taxation was held to be not contrary to the Treaty.
27
 Further, Kerckhaert and 
other subsequent case law evidence the ECJ’s return to its longstanding leniency for Member 
States’ direct taxation measures where they intersect with the fundamental freedoms—and the 
free movement of capital in particular.
28
 
                                                          
22
 See Jukka Snell ‘Free Movement of Capital: Evolution as a Non-Linear Process’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), 
The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert & Morres  
[2006] ECR 1-10967. 
23
 See Snell (n 22), pp 552-58; See also John A. Usher, ‘The Evolution of the Free Movement of Capital’ (2008) 
31:5 Fordham Int’l LJ 1533. 
24
 See Snell (n 22), pp 557-62; See also Thomas Horsley ‘The Concept of an Obstacle to Intra-EU Capital 
Movement in EU Law’ in Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Laurence W. Gormley (eds), From Single Market to Economic 
Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 165-66; Case C–439/97 
Sandoz [1999] ECR I–7041; Case C–319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I–7477. 
25
 Manninen (n 24), Opinion of AG Kokott, para 28. 
26
 Case C-376/03 D. v. inspecteur van de Belastingdienst [2005] ECR 1-5821 (Oct. 26, 2004), 85 
(Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer). 
27
 See Snell (n 22), at 563. 
28
 Ibid. 
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 While particular non-finance components are necessary to initiate and sustain a virtuous 
venture capital cycle (such as a highly educated, motivated population capable of becoming 
entrepreneurs), tax incentives, tax treatment, and legal (tax) certainty are of paramount 
importance in both attracting entrepreneurs as well as driving the financial commitments of 
reputable VC funds. The high level of risk that an entrepreneurial “idea”, emerging growth 
venture, or start-up will never be commercialized demands both tax incentives for risk-taking as 
well as confidence that an investor’s exit from a VC investment will not be subjected to 
unfavorable tax treatment. Thus, in that cross-border investment is often considered necessary 
for VC funds to achieve required economies of scale in the EU, the creation of a robust VC 
industry demands that the risk of double taxation in cross-border investments is eliminated. At 
the EU-level, this risk can be immediately addressed only through the collective will(s) of the 
Member States as manifested in secondary legislation. Otherwise, in light of the ECJ’s 2006 
decision in Kerckhaert, the middling VC industry of the EU appears certain to confront the 
Member States’ unreliable coordination of their overlapping, autonomous taxing jurisdictions 
under a continuing shadow of double taxation uncertainty. 
 
PART II — BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 
The original capital provisions contained in the Treaty of Rome were found by the ECJ in Casati 
to lack direct effect.
29
 Specifically, the provisions on capital movement were held to “differ from 
the provisions on the free movement of goods, persons, and services” in that the text of those on 
capital stated an obligation as to liberalization that was not imperative or absolute.
30
 The Court 
held that the obligation to liberalize capital movements was highly context-specific and varied 
“in time and [depended] on an assessment of the requirements of the Common Market and on an 
appraisal of both the advantages and risks which liberalization might entail”.31 Further, in 
holding that its obligation to liberalize capital movement was dynamic and flexible to the 
Member States’ economic and political goals, the Court also stressed that the assessment of the 
                                                          
29
 Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595, para 19. 
30
 Ibid, para 10. 
31
 Ibid; see Ryan Murphy, ‘Changing Treaty and Changing Economic Context: The Dynamic Relationship of the 
Legislature and the Judiciary in the Pursuit of Capital Liberalisation’ in P Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature 
and the EU Internal Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 277. 
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obligation “is, first and foremost, a matter for the Council”.32 The Court’s deference to the 
Council depended not only on the text of the Treaty provisions on capital as well as “the 
economic, pragmatic, and political ramifications of intervention in such a sensitive area”,33 but 
also on the fact that the Council had actively adopted Directives which made clear its hesitancy 
as to a full liberalization of capital movements.
34
 Indeed, the spirit of the Casati judgment 
evidenced both 1) the Court’s utmost self-restraint and deference to the legislative autonomy 
articulated in the Treaty and 2) the acknowledgment that “full liberalization of capital would 
require either the Member States to voluntarily liberalize it themselves or the EU to enact 
legislation”.35 
 Partly as a result of the Court’s decision in Casati, the free movement of capital was not 
developed at the same pace as the other freedoms.
36
 While a series of Directives on capital 
movements was successfully adopted in the early 1960s, these Directives were merely a means 
to merge the unilateral measures on capital that had already been independently implemented by 
the Member States.
37
 Correspondingly, when the Member States expressed aversion to further 
liberalization of capital movement at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, the 
Commission acquiesced to their collective will(s). In fact, it was only when France and a number 
of other key Member States had reached a consensus as to the need for liberalization in the early 
1980s that the Commission, again, developed into an active proponent of the free movement of 
capital.
38
 Thus, at the inception of the development of the free movement of capital, the Member 
States were the actual “driving force” that dictated the pace and breadth of liberalization.39 
Further, the cautious approach of both the Member States and the European institutions as to the 
                                                          
32
 Casati (n 29) para 11; R. Murphy (n 31), at 277. 
33
 R. Murphy (n 31), at 281. 
34
 Snell (n 22), at 550; M Poires Maduro, We The Court: The European Court of Justice and the European 
Economic Constitution (Hart, 1998) pp 76-78. 
35
 R. Murphy (n 31), pp 277-78. 
36
 Leo Flynn, ‘Coming of Age: The Free Movement of Capital Case Law 1993–2002’, 39 Common Market Law 
Review 773 (2002). 
37
 Age F.P. Bakker. The Liberalization of Capital Movements in Europe: The Monetary Committee and Financial 
Integration, 1958-1994 (Kluwer, 1996) at 88 and 93. 
38
 Ibid, pp 153-154. 
39
 See Snell (n 22), pp 550-51. 
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free movement of capital paralleled and was dependent primarily on prevailing economic theory 
(and experience) which warned strongly against full liberalization.
40
 
 It was only in 1988 that the Council adopted Directive 88/361 which held in unequivocal 
terms that “Member States shall abolish restrictions on movements of capital taking place 
between persons resident in Member States”.41 The Directive was the culmination of a build-up 
of support for liberalization from the European institutions in the form of both the Commission 
White Paper on Completing the Internal Market
42
 as well as the Single European Act 1986.
43
 
Again, though, the European institutions’ support was only initiated when a sufficient number of 
Member States had independently decided to relax their capital controls.
44
 Either way, Directive 
88/361 is described as the most important legislative intervention adopted by the Council in the 
field of capital in that it was only through this measure that full capital liberalization in the EU 
was enabled.
45
 Further, Murphy goes as far to state: 
Taken together, the Articles of the Directive required a high level of capital 
liberalization, with only limited possibilities for derogation. It is clear that the 
presumption of Member State legislative autonomy and control is reversed by the 
Directive.
46
 
While it was only three years later in 1991 that the main obligations of Directive 88/361 were 
incorporated within the Treaty framework (Maastricht), another interval was required before the 
capital provisions entered fully into force in 1994 in conjunction with the commencement of the 
second stage of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
47
 All told, it took nearly forty years for 
the Treaty of Rome’s “weakly worded [capital movement] Article with little legal or practical 
significance”48 to develop into a provision capable of imposing an obligation in line with those 
of the other Treaty freedoms.
49
 The unhurried development of the freedom was seemingly 
                                                          
40
 Catherine Barnard. The Substantive Law of the EU, The Four Freedoms (Oxford University Press, 2013) pp 580-
81; See also R. Murphy (n 31), at 279. 
41
 Council Directive 88/361 (EEC) for the implementation of Art 67 of the Treaty (1988) OJ L178/5.  
42
 Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 final 
(1990). 
43
 Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987); See Snell (n 22), at 551. 
44
 Maduro (n 34); Bakker (n 38); see also Snell (n 22), pp 550-54. 
45
 R. Murphy (n 31), at 281; Barnard (n 40), at 581. 
46
 R. Murphy (n 31), at 282. 
47
 Snell (n 22), at 551. 
48
 Ibid, at 548. 
49
 R. Murphy (n 31), at 289. 
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methodical, yet intermittent, and highly dependent on the fickle collective will(s) of the Member 
States. 
Ever since its confirmation of the direct effect of Directive 88/361 and what is now 
Article 63 TFEU,
50
 the ECJ’s approach to the free movement of capital has been expansive.51 
The Court’s judgments on capital quickly began to utilize language and analysis beyond that of 
mere discrimination and which paralleled its case law on the free movement of goods,
52
 
persons,
53
 and services.
54
 The ECJ confirmed its willingness to apply a non-hindrance test to 
capital movements in Commission v. Portuguese Republic (Re Golden Shares I) where it held 
that a national measure is subject to what is now Article 63(1) TFEU “even though the rules in 
issue may not give rise to unequal treatment”.55 While previous capital movement case law had 
utilized restriction-based language such as “liable to dissuade” or “liable to impede”, the ECJ’s 
ruling in Commission v. Portuguese Republic (Re Golden Shares I) confirmed unequivocally the 
principle that even a non-discriminatory national measure is capable of facing subjection to the 
Treaty’s free movement of capital provisions.56 In fact, in applying a “non-hindrance” test to 
capital movements, the Court further established its acknowledgment that the mere prohibition of 
discrimination is insufficient and simply ineffective in assessing national measures where there is 
nothing in a host Member State to which one can compare in a cross-border transaction.
57
 Still, 
and as the following sections will evidence, the ECJ’s application of broad, restriction-based 
analysis in its case law at the intersection of capital movements and Member State taxation has 
proven to be tempered by a consciousness of the economic and political paradigm in which the 
Treaty operates. AG Geelhoed expresses this consciousness in his opinion that, “judicial 
intervention is, by its nature, casuistic and fragmented [and as] a result, the Court should be 
cautious in giving an answer to questions arising before it raising issues of a systematic nature. 
                                                          
50
 Case C-358/93 Bordessa [1995] ECR I-361; Case C-163/94 Sanz de Lera [1995] ECR I-4821. 
51
 L. Flynn (n 36), pp 778—85. 
52
 See, inter alia, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649 
53
 See, inter alia, Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337; Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
54
 See, inter alia, Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631; Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221 
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The legislator is better placed to deal with such questions, in particular when they raise issues of 
inherent fiscal-economic policy considerations”.58 
 
PART III — THE INTERSECTION OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 
AND NATIONAL DIRECT TAXATION MEASURES 
1. NON-DISCRIMINATION VERSUS NON-HINDRANCE TESTS? 
Article 63 TFEU “prohibits all restrictions on capital” and the ECJ has found that the Article 
encompasses national measures which are 1) directly or indirectly discriminatory as well as 2) 
non-discriminatory but which substantially hinder access to the market. Much of the literature on 
the free movement of capital stresses the lack of clarity in the case law and, in particular, with 
regard to the delineation between these two forms of prohibition. In fact, the ECJ has not yet 
formulated a clear-cut standard pertaining to whether a national measure shall be assessed by 
means of a “non-discrimination test” or, on the contrary, a “non-hindrance test”.59 In describing 
the ECJ’s unsystematic application of these tests, Hindelang states that the Court’s case law 
evidences an unorthodox “tendency to consider clearly discriminating national measures in terms 
of the non-hindrance test”.60 In general, he states: 
The Court, while certainly acknowledging that national measures that differentiate 
on the basis of nationality, residence, etc can constitute discrimination, fails to put 
forward reasoning of a more doctrinal nature on what constitutes direct and 
indirect discrimination. Moreover, it appears that the Court does not attempt 
seriously to delineate clearly the ‘non-discrimination’ from the ‘non-hindrance’ 
test.
61
  
For example, the decision in Verkooijen marks not only the origin of the ECJ’s case law at the 
intersection of taxation and intra-EU capital movements, but is also a case where the Court 
utilized language signifying a form of non-hindrance test where the contested rule was simply 
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discriminatory.
62
 Although the national provision at issue was clearly discriminatory with regard 
to dividends on shares deriving from another Member State, the Court utilized the language of 
the non-hindrance test in finding that the measure had a “dissuading” effect. Only during the 
justification phase of its ruling did the Court then consider the discriminatory nature of the 
provision at issue.
63
 Indeed, the ECJ’s expansive approach to the free movement of capital has 
been said to mask a “more sober reality” that in the majority of its decisions, “it is old-fashioned 
discrimination analysis that operates behind the more dynamic language of deterrent and 
dissuasive effects”.64  
Indeed, the ECJ’s jurisprudence at the intersection of free movement of capital and 
national direct taxation measures highlights the lack of clarity as to the “formula” for application 
of either a non-discrimination or non-hindrance test. While the ECJ has firmly entrenched its 
application of a non-hindrance test to nearly all non-taxation measures that fall within Article 
63(1) TFEU,
65
 the Court follows the established case law of the other Treaty freedoms by 
relying—in substance as opposed to language—almost exclusively on discrimination analysis to 
evaluate national direct taxation measures.
66
 As will be evidenced in greater detail subsequently, 
much of the case law at the intersection of national direct taxation measures and the free 
movement of services and persons has been transposed in the ambit of free movement of capital 
(e.g., Schumacker).
67
 Nevertheless, with regard to the preferred test in direct taxation cases, 
Koen Lenaerts has observed that the ECJ prefers utilizing an elaborate form of the non-
discrimination test as opposed to a restriction-based approach.
68
 Similarly, AG Kokott stresses 
that a general non-hindrance test is incompatible with direct taxation cases in that such an 
approach would lead to a legal paradigm in which every tax measure would necessitate 
evaluation under EU law.
69
 Further, AG Geelhoed has stated that the concept of indistinctly 
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applicable “restrictions” of freedom of movement cannot legitimately be transposed per se to the 
direct tax sphere.
70
 Indeed, Snell points out that despite a terminological shift in 1997 (albeit in 
an establishment case)
71
 from discrimination- to restriction- or obstacle-based language in its 
direct taxation jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court continues to depend in reality on a more 
restrained, discrimination-based approach.
72
  
The establishment of discrimination requires that “the capital movement that is affected 
by the national measure and the capital movement that is not, in objective terms, are both placed 
in comparable circumstances”.73 More specifically, discrimination can only be present where the 
Court determines that there is either 1) unequal treatment of similar or comparable situations or 
2) equal treatment of differing or incomparable situations.
74
 Unfortunately, the ECJ is yet to 
provide a coherently articulated standard for what particular attributes or circumstances establish 
“comparability”.75 According to Hindelang:  
[It] is clear that the two capital movements to be compared need not and cannot 
be identical, but must be comparable in certain essential attributes… No general 
test exists to identify these “essential attributes”, but they are determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The “essential attributes” must be deduced primarily from 
actual circumstances and conditions, against the background of the purpose and 
content of the respective national measure, and under consideration of the value-
based decisions stipulated by the Community legal order.
76
 
Specifically, the sets of capital movements that are compared by the ECJ include both cross-
border with domestic as well as cross-border with cross-border.
77
 Consequently, one’s tax base 
as a byproduct of a taxpayer’s (non-)residency in a particular Member State is the most likely 
“essential attribute” to establish comparability. Following tax base, other attributes most 
frequently utilized by the Court to establish comparability include the nature of the taxpayer’s 
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economic activity as well as the portion of income sourced in the taxing host state.
78
 Practically 
speaking, the seminal holding in Schumacker that “[i]n relation to direct taxes, the situations of 
residents and of non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable”79 is indicative of the longstanding 
custom of international tax law that resident and non-resident taxpayers are nearly always subject 
to differing tax bases.
80
 Generally, while residents are taxable by their home state on their 
worldwide income, non-residents are only taxable on income sourced in the host state.
81
 Still, 
regardless of different tax bases, the ECJ often finds resident and non-resident taxpayers to be 
comparable. Conversely, “[j]ust as differences in the tax base [have] not always lead to the 
conclusion that the internal and cross-border situation were dissimilar, similarities in tax base did 
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that tax situations were similar”.82 
The standard in Schumacker as to comparability, coupled with the standard’s inconsistent 
application across the Court’s tax jurisprudence, exemplifies the basic tension between EU free 
movement law and tax law. While an essential principle of the ECJ’s case law on free movement 
holds that differential treatment of residents and non-residents constitutes indirect discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality, the traditional premise of national and international tax law is that 
nationality and residence are perfectly acceptable distinguishing criteria.
83
 In fact, the 
foundational approach to establishing jurisdiction over matters of taxation is based on the 
principle of territoriality which, accordingly, “refers to jurisdiction over persons, matters and 
things within the geographical boundaries of a State”.84 Consequently, Wattel describes the 
tension between EU free movement law and tax law as a “struggle between…two in principle 
irreconcilable positions of allowing Member States to protect their taxing jurisdiction as defined 
by them, and at the same time prohibiting them to tax cross-border positions less favorably than 
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comparable [purely] domestic positions”.85 Thus, seemingly, the ECJ’s “inconsistent” case law 
in direct taxation cases might simply be the understandable result of its role at the intersection of 
two contrary bodies of law. Still, within the ECJ’s analysis and determination of potential 
comparators, the Court’s process of comparison evidences more specific layers of 
inconsistency.
86
 For example, the ECJ often compares only the factual circumstances of resident 
and non-resident taxpayers.
87
 In other cases, for example in Royal Bank of Scotland and Saint-
Gobain, the only point of comparison was the legal situation of the potential comparators.
88
 
Further, in other cases the Court has stated directly that comparability can only exist where 
factual circumstances are considered in light of a legal rule.
89
  
The legal uncertainty spawned by the ECJ’s inconsistent approach to identifying 
comparators in its tax discrimination jurisprudence is reinforced by what is often described as a 
sheer lack of transparency as to the Court’s case-by-case reasoning. Mason holds the ECJ’s tax 
discrimination jurisprudence “to be arbitrary, ungrounded, and overly formalistic”.90 Further, she 
states that the non-transparent formality of the non-discrimination test as applied to direct 
taxation enables the Court to strategically select comparators and retain the competence to 
classify virtually any national tax provision either as discriminatory or non-discriminatory.
91
 
With regard to this non-transparent formalism in the context of the Court’s role within the 
framework of the Treaty, Maduro states: 
[B]y presenting courts as merely the appliers of preexisting law, formal reasoning 
denies discretion, isolates judicial decisions from extra-legal considerations and 
confers upon those decisions an appearance of neutrality. Courts are thus 
distinguished from political bodies which exercise discretion for political 
reasons.
92
  
Still, and as will be discussed in the following sub-section, the non-transparent formality of the 
non-discrimination test can often entail dubiousness where the Court must distinguish prohibited 
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discrimination from non-prohibited “disparities” stemming from the co-existence of overlapping 
national taxation measures that inevitably exist in cross-border movements.
93
 Thus, the ECJ’s 
reliance on non-transparent formalism can be seen as an attempt to avoid the appearance of 
second-guessing democratic will or, as referred to earlier, the collective will(s) of the Member 
States.
94
  
2. DISCRIMINATION VERSUS DISPARITY? 
An inevitable consequence of the co-existence of the discrete national tax systems of the 
Member States is that disparities exist between the autonomous rules of these jurisdictions.
95
 
Within the ambit of cross-border economic activity, these disparities are capable of manifesting 
as tax disadvantages (e.g., juridical double taxation). Still, not all disparities that result in cross-
border tax disadvantages amount to a violation of the non-discrimination principle.
96
 For 
example, if Ireland treats capital gains more favorably than Germany and an Irish citizen 
subsequently faces less favorable capital gains treatment on a cross-border investment in 
Germany, such a situation is generally not considered by the ECJ to be discriminatory. While 
such disparate tax treatment inevitably distorts cross-border investment decisions, the ECJ has 
specifically held that the Treaty offers no guarantee to an EU taxpayer that economic activity 
between two or more Member States will be neutral with regard to taxation.
97
 In fact, the Court 
has consistently held that the free movement provisions are not concerned with any disparities in 
tax treatment which result from the overlapping or concurrent taxation of a single item of income 
by multiple Member States.
98
  
The inevitability of concurrent direct taxation is due to the traditional, international tax 
paradigm in which both residence (home) and source (host) states have the right to tax.
99
 
Allocation of taxing rights within the ambit of concurrent taxation is coordinated through either 
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1) self-imposed unilateral limitations on jurisdiction initiated by the Member States or 2) 
DTCs.
100
 Generally, the purpose of a DTC is to avoid double taxation as well as to outline the 
methodology by which both Member States will, in parallel, “carve up” the tax revenue 
generated by cross-border income.
101
 Within this framework of concurrent taxation, the ECJ has 
been forced to determine whether a mere tax disparity with a resultant net tax disadvantage to a 
taxpayer is, in fact, the result of a particular Member State’s discriminatory measure. 
Conversely, the ECJ is confronted by situations where a tax disparity with a resultant net tax 
advantage to a taxpayer, in fact, obscures the discriminatory measure of a particular Member 
State.
102
 Indeed, distinguishing cross-border tax disadvantages that are a result of disparities from 
those resulting from discrimination has proven to be a complicated task for the ECJ which has 
been marked by mixed results.
103
  
Triangular or multi-angular tax situations can further muddle the ECJ’s distinctions 
between disparities and discrimination. For example, in De Groot, a Dutch national and resident 
earned most of his income in the Netherlands but some of it was sourced in three other Member 
States.
104
 Dutch tax law utilized a “proportionality method” (pro rata parte) which allowed for 
personal deductions only in proportion to the taxpayer’s Dutch-source income.105 In that the 
other three Member States did not utilize a parallel, coordinated proportionality method and were 
under no obligation to offer a non-resident any deductions whatsoever,
106
 the taxpayer’s 
deductions were taken into account far less than would have been the case in a purely domestic 
situation. While the taxpayer argued that the tax disadvantage was discriminatory, the 
Netherlands government held that the tax disadvantage was simply the result of disparities 
between its tax system and those of the other Member States at issue.
107
 In rejecting the 
argument of the Netherlands government, the ECJ relied on its ruling in Schumacker to hold that 
the residence Member State has the primary responsibility to afford personal tax benefits such as 
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deductions in cross-border economic activity. This responsibility is based on the—possibly 
outdated—assumption that a taxpayer will earn most of his income in his state of residence.108 
Either way, while the Court held the Dutch proportionality method to be discriminatory (as 
opposed to a mere disparity), the Court actually utilized language of the non-hindrance test in 
stating that the measure “discouraged” the taxpayer from taking up employment in another 
Member State.
109
 Further, in that the Netherlands government had relied on the ECJ’s holding in 
Gilly that higher taxation in a cross-border tax situation due to tax rate disparities is not 
discriminatory, the Court summarily distinguished the cases in that the “tax disadvantage 
suffered by Mr de Groot is in no way…the result of the difference between the tax rates of the 
State of residence and those of the States of employment”.110 
Instead, the ECJ in De Groot relied on both Schumacker and Gilly to hold that the Dutch 
pro rata parte method of taxation was, in itself, discriminatory and thus contrary to Community 
free movement law. In fact, as Lang points out, “[r]eaders of the Opinion of Advocate General 
Léger are given the impression that the case of the ECJ was all too obvious on this issue”.111 In 
fact though, the Court’s ruling was delivered as such despite the actuality that neither 
Schumacker nor Gilly provided an unambiguous answer as to whether the loss of personal 
deductions due to the application of the pro rata parte method was indeed discriminatory.
112
 
While a systematic application of the ECJ’s decisions in Schumacker and Gilly does indeed 
support the holding that the Netherlands was under an obligation to take account of the total 
personal deductions applicable in its jurisdiction (in that the Netherlands was the Member State 
of residence and the majority of the taxpayer’s income was earned there),113 a closer comparison 
of Gilly and De Groot demonstrates that these decisions are fundamentally inconsistent.
114
 In 
citing to the observations of Wattel, Lang stresses that in Gilly, “it appears that the ECJ was not 
aware of the fact that the [Member] State of residence (France) applied the pro rata parte 
method” and that, in fact, Gilly “raised the same issue as De Groot”.115 Both cases featured 
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national direct taxation measures which caused net tax disadvantages within the context of 
DTCs. But, in Gilly, the Court failed entirely to take notice of national taxation measures in 
France which also utilized a pro rata parte method and which had the effect of 1) decreasing 
host-state deductions by 55% and 2) completely nullifying all home-state deductions.
116
 Thus, in 
Gilly—as opposed to De Groot—the Court held that the net tax disadvantage was simply the 
result of disparities in the natural course of cross-border economic activity.
117
 
The Court’s reliance on “the Schumacker doctrine” to single-out the Dutch pro rata parte 
method as opposed to national measures of other Member States with similar design and effects 
illustrates that the non-transparent formality of the Court’s decisions sometimes results in 
decisions that appear arbitrary or unfounded. Effectively highlighting the dubious reasoning 
behind the Court’s distinction between discrimination and disparity in the context of concurrent 
taxation, Mason states: 
[I]f the other countries employed the proportionality method, De Groot could, in 
sum, be entitled to more personal tax benefits than if he had income only in the 
Netherlands. He could also be entitled to less. Whether De Groot would come out 
ahead or behind (as compared to a Dutch resident with only Dutch-source 
income) would depend on the amount of personal [deductions] offered by 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
118
 
In fact, the above hypothetical refers to an essential and unsettled issue of whether the ECJ—as a 
part of its “formula” for delineating between discrimination and disparity—should consider a 
Member State’s measure 1) in isolation (the “per-country approach”) or 2) in comparison to the 
measures of other Member States with which the measure in question is supposed to be 
coordinated (the “overall approach”).119 The two approaches are incompatible with each other 
and have been utilized by the Court at different times.
120
 For example, in Eurowings, the Court 
utilized the per-country approach to hold that a Member State may not justify tax discrimination 
on the grounds that the taxpayer is subject to lower taxation or “positive” concurrent tax 
treatment in another Member State.
121
 Differently, and as will be discussed at length in the 
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following section, in Manninen the ECJ utilized the overall approach and thus considered—in its 
entirety—the tax paradigm established by the concurrent taxation measures of the differing 
Member States.
122
 While these opposing approaches might understandably be specifically 
applicable to particular tax situations, Mason stresses that “the Court has offered no explanation 
for why it vacillates between the approaches, and, indeed, it has never explicitly acknowledged 
that it has adopted different approaches in different cases”.123 She observes further that the 
application of the overall approach is hardly consistent in itself considering the Court 
“sometimes analyzes the actual law of the other Member States involved, but at other times it 
speculates about what the other State’s law might be and decides the case based on those 
assumptions”.124 
 Regardless of the actual effectiveness of the per-country and overall approach with regard 
to distinguishing accurately between discrimination and disparity, AG Geelhoed has stated his 
preference for the overall approach.
125
 Specifically, he stresses that only the overall approach 
enables concurrent taxation measures to be seen within the context of their co-existence or “be 
seen as a whole, or as achieving a type of equilibrium”.126 Dissimilarly, while the per-country 
approach is capable of deciphering those national taxation measures which are discriminatory on 
their face, said approach is not capable of an accurate examination of the myriad autonomous 
taxation measures that inevitably interact with each other through cross-border economic 
activity.
127
 But, in that the overall approach necessitates the comparison (and judgment) of the 
legislation of various Member States, the overall approach can be said to erode Member State tax 
sovereignty.
128
 Further, as numerous commentators have pointed out, the overall approach raises 
the question of whether the ECJ is actually capable of such an examination. To define and 
decipher an entire paradigm of interacting, concurrent taxation measures is quite problematic in 
that 1) the ECJ is not comprised of experts in taxation and 2) the comparison of multiple 
concurrent national taxation measures (both real and hypothetical) inevitably leads to legitimate 
                                                          
122
 See Mason (n 93), at 1304; Manninen (note 24 above) para 54; see also Marks & Spencer (n 82) para 55. 
123
 Mason (n 93), at 1305. 
124
 Ibid. 
125
 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue (n 58), Opinion of AG 
Geelhoed, para 72. 
126
 Ibid. 
127
 Mason (n 93), at 1306.  
128
 Weber (n 102), pp 602-03. 
25 
 
issues of legal certainty.
129
 Nevertheless, while AG Geelhoed famously presented his 
generalization in ACT Group Litigation that the key feature distinguishing disparity from 
discrimination is that discrimination “occur[s] as the result of the rules of just one tax 
jurisdiction”,130 this statement fails to address the situation that nearly all cross-border economic 
activity in the EU entails the concurrent tax jurisdiction of at least two Member States.
131
 
Clearly, not all concurrently applicable national taxation measures are non-discriminatory. And, 
despite copious analysis of ECJ case law, the fact remains that regardless of what standard(s) the 
Court utilizes to determine whether national taxation measures entail discrimination or disparity, 
“overlapping taxation as a structural feature of international taxation tends to obscure the 
presence of discrimination in some cases and to suggest its presence where there is none in other 
cases”.132 
 
PART IV — SANDOZ, MANNINEN, KERCKHAERT: AN ABANDONED FORAY 
INTO THE REALM OF DIRECT TAXATION MEASURES 
1. THE GROUNDWORK 
As mentioned earlier, the ECJ for a brief time appeared willing to apply the full weight of the 
non-hindrance test to its case law at the intersection of national direct taxation measures and the 
free movement of capital.
133
  In Sandoz, the Court reviewed a non-discriminatory measure in the 
form of an Austrian stamp duty of 0.8 percent applicable to loans obtained by resident taxpayers 
in Austria. The tax was imposed on loans regardless of whether the provider of the loan was 
established in Austria or another Member State. Further, the tax was applicable regardless of the 
nationality of the resident that obtained the loan.
134
  The Court followed the Opinion of AG 
Léger in holding that the required tax on loans contracted on a cross-border basis (outside 
Austria) was a “restriction” on the free movement of capital in that it “deprive[d] residents of a 
Member State of the possibility of benefiting from the absence of taxation which may be 
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associated with loans obtained outside the national territory…[and that] such a measure [was] 
likely to deter such residents from obtaining loans from persons established in other Member 
States”.135  Again, while the Court’s case law has at times displayed the language of the non-
hindrance test in striking down Member State measures that are actually discriminatory,
136
 in 
Sandoz the ECJ appears to have relied on the actual substance of the disputed measure.
137
  In 
describing the apparently paradigm-shifting result of the decision, Horsley explains: 
The Court’s decision obliged the Austrian State to justify, under EU law, its 
decision not to adjust its non-discriminatory tax rules to preserve, for resident 
taxpayers, an advantage arising through “disparities” between different tax 
regimes within the Union.
138
 
Still, regardless of the fact that the Court boldly utilized a non-hindrance test in holding the 
substance of a non-discriminatory direct taxation measure to be a restriction of free movement, 
both Horsley and Snell—among others—stress that the Court’s treatment of the Austrian 
measure at the justification-phase of the proceeding was most generous.
139
  In fact, Snell states 
that the Court’s standard for justification in Sandoz implies that the Court “would permit 
essentially all equally applicable national tax rules”.140  Indeed, while Horsley considers Sandoz 
to represent “the high-water mark” at the intersection of national direct taxation and the free 
movement of capital, Snell holds that the decision in the case should be weighted with 
“considerable caution” in light of the Court’s leniency as to the Austrian justification.141   
 Differently, yet using identical language, Snell considers Manninen to represent “the 
high-water mark” of the Court’s application of the non-hindrance test at the intersection of direct 
taxation and the free movement of capital.
142
  In this case, as mentioned in Part I, AG Kokott 
explicitly held in her opinion that even within the ambit of national direct taxation measures, “the 
concept of a restriction of capital movements corresponds to the concept of a restriction that the 
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Court has developed with regard to the other fundamental freedoms”.143 The direct taxation 
measure at issue was a method by which the Finnish government taxed Finnish resident 
taxpayers on dividends distributed by Finnish companies. The Finnish system taxed these purely 
domestic dividend distributions twice; a corporate tax was applied when the company earned the 
profits and income tax was applied to the same item of income when it had been distributed to 
the resident shareholder.
144
 Thus, Finland granted tax credits to resident shareholders of domestic 
companies in order to relieve the burden of economic double taxation on corporate profits. In 
fact, this system guaranteed that resident taxpayers receiving dividends from Finnish companies 
did not suffer tax treatment on the dividends in excess of the Finnish income tax rate of 29 
percent.
145
 Dissimilarly, such credits were not made available to Finnish resident taxpayers on 
dividends distributed by companies located in other Member States in that 1) Finland only taxed 
foreign profits / dividends once in the form of income tax applicable to the shareholder upon 
distribution and 2) Finland was not responsible for the existence of economic double taxation on 
dividends distributed by companies outside of its taxing jurisdiction.
146
  
 Manninen was a shareholder in a Swedish company that distributed a dividend on which 
he was responsible to pay income tax in Finland. Manninen was subsequently denied the 
aforementioned tax credits and thus argued that the Finnish taxation measure was 
discriminatory.
147
 Finland defended its taxation measure on the ground that the capital movement 
at issue—an inbound corporate profit distribution—was not comparable to purely domestic profit 
distributions in that Finland did not subject inbound distributions to either corporate taxation or 
economic double taxation.
148
 Still, in utilizing the overall approach, the ECJ determined that the 
inbound corporate profit distribution had been subjected both to Swedish corporate taxes and 
economic double taxation.
149
 Further, based on the taxpayer’s subjection to economic double 
taxation, the Court held that this capital movement in the form of an inbound corporate profit 
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distribution was, in fact, comparable to a purely domestic situation.
150
 Specifically, the Court 
stated: 
Where a person fully taxable in Finland invests capital in a company established 
in Sweden, there is thus no way of escaping double taxation of the profits 
distributed by the company in which the investment is made. In the face of a tax 
rule which takes account of the corporation tax owed by a company in order to 
prevent double taxation of the profits distributed, shareholders who are fully 
taxable in Finland find themselves in a comparable situation, whether they receive 
dividends from a company established in that Member State or from a company 
established in Sweden.
151
 
However, regardless of the above discrimination-based analysis, the aggressiveness of the 
Court’s decision in Manninen is exemplified by the explicit use of not only the language but, 
seemingly, the substance of the non-hindrance test.
152
 In light of AG Kokott’s promotion of a 
broad definition of the concept of a restriction of capital movement
153
 and the Court’s citing to 
Verkooijen, the ECJ held that the Finnish direct taxation legislation had the effect of “deterring” 
fully taxable persons in Finland from investing their capital in companies established in another 
Member State.
154
 Further, the measure at issue was held to make cross-border shareholdings 
“less attractive” to investors residing in Finland.155  
 While Manninen is representative of ECJ’s progressive “application of the full force of 
the internal market law in the field of taxation”, this decision and its immediately preceding case 
law inspired much uneasiness and a large range of critical analyses from both the Member States 
as well as the international tax law community.
156
 With regard to the Finnish taxation measure in 
Manninen, Weber—among many others—stresses that the ECJ failed to properly distinguish 
between discrimination and mere disparity within the context of the non-discrimination test.
157
 In 
fact, Weber’s criticism entails little to no recognition of the possibility that the non-hindrance 
test was influential on the Court aside from a brief acknowledgment that the Court made “a 
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reference to decisions like Verkooijen”.158 Rather, Weber appears to utilize a per-country 
approach to describe the particular Finnish direct taxation measure as merely a taxation system 
or “method” by which Finland exercised its sovereignty to tax profits once they enter Finland's 
tax jurisdiction.
159
 He describes the Finnish system as 1) completely logical, 2) non-
discriminatory in both principle and practice, and 3) simply disparate from the many other 
methods that can be utilized to ensure that a shareholder's income is only subject to income tax—
as opposed to economic double taxation.
160
 Quite scathingly, Weber stresses that “[n]ot crediting 
foreign corporation tax is a [net tax] disadvantage that arises because several Member States are 
exercising their sovereignty to levy tax (disparity) and it is not the consequence of a 
discriminatory tax system in one Member State”.161    
The ECJ’s difficulty in distinguishing between discrimination and disparity, coupled with 
its apparent attempt to include non-discriminatory direct taxation measures within the ambit of 
its restriction-based jurisprudence, combined to threaten the balance of power between the 
Member States and the Union as to the overall regulation of the internal market. Specifically, the 
potential inclusion of non-discriminatory direct taxation measures within the ECJ’s ever-
broadening definition of the free movement of capital was seen as a direct assault on the 
sovereign right of the Member States to raise tax revenue in support of their economic and social 
policies.
162
 As Horsley articulately summarizes:  
If the ECJ opts to define the scope of the Treaty freedoms broadly, it thereby 
increases its own power of review over the substantive policy preferences of the 
Member States in this area of shared competence. By contrast, a narrower 
approach operates to immunize a greater body of national law from scrutiny 
against the Treaty framework. There is as yet no consensus on how to strike the 
appropriate balance between Union and Member State competence in this context 
and the issue remains hotly contested.
163
 
The ECJ’s decision in Kerckhaert is considered to be an abrupt and decisive change of course 
from what had become a most controversial line of cases. Still, Kerckhaert is considered neither 
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to be indisputable in its reasoning nor a decision which facilitated any reconciliation or balancing 
of the inherent conflict between national direct tax sovereignty and free movement. In fact, it can 
be said that the decision may have had the opposite effect of reconciliation.   
2. KERCKHAERT & MORRES 
Before the ECJ’s decision in Kerckhaert and in light of the progressive line of cases just 
described which culminated with Manninen, a vast number of scholars as well as the European 
Commission expressed the position that “Member States are bound by the Treaty principle of 
free movement within the Community to avoid and eliminate double taxation”.164 Further, three 
years before the ECJ’s decision in Kerckhaert, the Commission explicitly argued that higher 
taxation of cross-border dividends should be deemed a restriction in violation of the free 
movement of capital.
165
 In fact, because of a “growing consensus” that double taxation was in 
contravention of the Treaty freedoms, academic discussion quite presumptuously transferred to 
the follow-up questions of whether the residence (home) or source (host) Member State should 
have the obligation to relieve said double taxation and which particular method of relief would 
be best-suited for that purpose.
166
 Thus, there was an element of surprise when AG Geelhoed’s 
subsequent opinions in both ACT Group Litigation
167
 as well as Kerckhaert
168
 defined double 
taxation as mere a “quasi-restriction” or a net tax disadvantage resulting from disparities present 
in the concurrent application of the tax systems of multiple Member States.
169
 Harkening back to 
the Court’s rigid utilization of the language and substance of the non-discrimination test, in 
Kerckhaert the ECJ 1) attempted to distinguish cases such as Manninen on the basis of the 
substance of the national measure at issue, 2) utilized discrimination analysis to evaluate the 
legality of identical tax treatment to allegedly incomparable situations under EU free movement 
                                                          
164
 Response from Commissioner Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission to Written Question E-2287/99 by 
Karin Riis-Jorgensen (ELDR) to the Commission with regard to the “Right to freedom of movement and Danish 
tax rules”, 2000 O.J. (C 225) 87. 
165
 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, Dividend Taxation of Individuals in the Internal Market, COM (2003) 
810 final (Dec. 19, 2003); Georg W. Kofler & Ruth Mason, ‘Double Taxation: A European “Switch in Time?”’, 14 
Colum. J. Eur. L. 63 (2007), at 77. 
166
 Kofler & Mason (n 165), at 77.  
167
 Test Claimants v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue (n 58), para 48. 
168
 Kerckhaert & Morres (n 22), para 31. 
169
 Kofler & Mason (n 165), at 74. 
31 
 
law and, finally, 3) addressed the existence net tax disadvantages caused by disparities arising 
from multiple Member States’ parallel exercise of fiscal / tax sovereignty.170 
In Kerckhaert, Belgian taxpayers received dividends from Eurofers SARL—a company 
established in France—and, per the provisions of the Belgian-French DTC, France imposed a 
15% withholding tax on the dividends before their cross-border distribution. When these 
taxpayers eventually included the profit from the dividends as a part of their personal income tax 
return in Belgium, Belgium assessed an additional tax of 25% and did not credit or “impute” the 
French withholding tax.
171
 While the taxpayers considered this tax treatment to be a violation of 
the DTC, the Belgian national courts ruled otherwise.
172
 Moreover, even though the 
aforementioned imputation method was not utilized, the French tax was nonetheless taken into 
account by the Belgian tax authorities in the form of a deduction from a taxpayers’ tax base in 
Belgium.
173
 Still, and despite the fact that the Belgian tax was assessed equally to both domestic 
and cross-border dividends, the combination of the French withholding tax and the Belgian 
refusal to impute said withholding tax resulted in a higher tax burden for cross-border 
dividends.
174
 In light of the ECJ’s previous rulings with regard to equal tax treatment of differing 
or incomparable situations,
175
 the Belgian national court requested a preliminary ruling as to 
whether what is now Article 63 must be: 
interpreted as prohibiting a restriction resulting from a provision in the income tax 
legislation of a Member State…which subjects dividends from resident 
companies and dividends from companies resident in another Member State to the 
same uniform tax rate, without in the latter case providing for the setting off of tax 
levied at source in that other Member State[.]
176
 
Consequently, while the request stemmed merely from a Belgian direct taxation measure in the 
context of a DTC, the more far-reaching legal question at issue in Kerckhaert was whether 
juridical double taxation was a breach of the free movement of capital.
177
  
                                                          
170
 Ibid, pp 74-79; Snell (n 22), pp 558-63; Snell (n 64), pp 358-66. 
171
 Kerckhaert & Morres (n 22), paras 3-12. 
172
 Ibid. 
173
 Kofler & Mason (n 165), pp 75-76. 
174
 Ibid. 
175
 See note 74 and the accompanying text. 
176
 Kerckhaert & Morres (n 22), para 14. 
177
 Kofler & Mason (n 165), at 76. 
32 
 
The Court’s decision was quite brief and its discrimination analysis hinged on an 
assessment of the comparability of capital movements and/or taxpayers.
178
 In citing to both 
Verkooijen and Manninen, the Court referred to the fact that the Member State taxation measures 
at issue in those cases treated income generated from cross-border dividends differently than 
income generated from purely domestic dividends. More specifically, the direct taxation 
measures at issue in Verkooijen and Manninen were held to deny recipients of cross-border 
dividends the tax benefits granted to those shareholders receiving purely domestic dividends. 
Because in Verkooijen and Manninen the ECJ concluded that the situation of taxpayers receiving 
cross-border dividends was comparable to (or, at least “not objectively different from”) the 
situation of those taxpayers receiving domestic dividends, the Court held that the measures at 
issue amounted to discrimination.
179
 Differently, while the Court in Kerckhaert cited to 
Schumacker and Royal Bank of Scotland
180
 in conceding that discriminatory tax measures can 
consist of the application of the same rule to different or incomparable situations, the Court 
stressed that the situation of a taxpayer that receives cross-border dividends is not necessarily 
incomparable to the situation of a taxpayer that receives only domestic dividends.
181
 Further, the 
Court held that—unlike the measures at issue in Verkooijen and Manninen—the substance of the 
contested Belgian tax legislation did not make any explicit distinction between cross-border and 
domestic dividends. Rather, both cross-border and domestic dividends were merely subjected to 
a uniform rate of income tax.
182
 Thus, in the absence of sufficient evidence of an objective 
difference between the situations of the applicants and other resident taxpayers receiving 
dividend income only from companies established in Belgium, the ECJ held that the Belgian tax 
treatment did not amount to discrimination.
183
 Finally, with regard to the Court’s delineation 
between discrimination and disparity, the difference in tax treatment of cross-border dividends 
was held to be merely the result of “the exercise in parallel by two Member States of their fiscal 
sovereignty”.184  
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3. KERCKHAERT CRITICISM AND DEBATE 
The lingering criticism and debate with regard to the above line of case law lends to the opinion 
that the ECJ’s effort to delineate between discrimination and disparity is both dubious and a 
cause of legitimate legal uncertainty. For example, one of the ECJ’s primary grounds for 
distinguishing Kerckhaert entailed the simple premise that while these earlier cases featured 
national measures which explicitly distinguished between cross-border and domestic dividends, 
the Belgian tax at issue was equally applicable to all dividends received by resident taxpayers.
185
 
Yet, as to this line of argument, Snell stresses that the distinction drawn between Kerckhaert and 
the earlier cases “is not sound” and was hardly “forced upon it by an inevitable Cartesian 
logic”.186 In fact, both Verkooijen and Manninen entail rulings in which ECJ appeared to utilize 
the overall approach to evaluate an entire tax paradigm comprised of the concurrent taxation 
measures of multiple Member States. Thus, both Verkooijen and Manninen can be read in 
conjunction as a requirement imposed on the Member States to recognize the concurrently 
applicable tax systems of other Member States.
187
 In effect, the Court’s ruling in Manninen 
entailed the “mutual recognition” of a foreign tax for the purpose of granting a tax credit.188 
Differently, the Court’s ruling in Kerckhaert “emphatically denies” any requirement on the part 
of the Belgian government to recognize the concurrent taxation measure of France.
189
 Thus, with 
regard to the applicability of a form of mutual recognition within the ambit of cross-border 
taxation, the ECJ has never made clear why such recognition is necessary—in particular 
instances—when a Member State grants a tax advantage (Manninen) but unnecessary when the 
Member State imposes a tax (Kerckhaert).
190
 Similarly, beyond the cases of Verkooijen and 
Manninen, Kofler and Mason state that the ECJ’s ruling in Kerckhaert abandons its mutual 
recognition jurisprudence as well as its prior jurisprudence on the double use of losses as 
exemplified by Marks & Spencer.
191
 While the ruling in Marks & Spencer featured the principle 
of mutual recognition as a means to prevent EU taxpayers from utilizing tax losses to offset 
income in more than Member State, in Kerckhaert the Court appears to hold that mutual 
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recognition of concurrent taxation measures is not required to protect taxpayers from juridical 
double taxation.
192
 With regard to this inconsistent application of the principle of mutual 
recognition, Kofler and Mason stress that the Court’s decision in Kerckhaert “creates a striking 
asymmetry” which is arguably quite unacceptable to the functioning of the internal market.193   
Nevertheless, to be clear, Snell certainly recognizes the possibility that the logic whereby 
dual burdens are evaluated in light of the principle of mutual recognition
194
 can be neither 1) 
transposed fully within the ambit of national direct taxation measures, nor 2) applied to double 
taxation.
195
 While Vanistendael is of the opinion that the principle of mutual recognition—as 
established by the ECJ’s non-taxation case law—can and should be applied to Member State 
direct taxation measures,
196
 those such as Weber stress the need for a much more restrained 
approach.
197
 Specifically, Weber states that to determine whether the principle of mutual 
recognition should be applied to a particular area of the law without infringing upon the 
sovereignty of the individual Member States, “one has to take into consideration the basic 
assumptions that are characteristic for this area of the law (object and purpose, general contours, 
substance in the various Member States) and the extent to which the national law is 
harmonized”.198 In citing to Heylens and Vlassopoulou to highlight situations in which Member 
State sovereignty was held to be less important than particular harmonizing measures,
199
 Weber 
explains:  
Whether the unrestricted freedom of movement weighs more heavily than a 
breach of the sovereignty of the Member States will have to be considered. It is 
therefore no coincidence that the principle of mutual recognition is applied in 
particular in those areas in which sovereignty is not a pressing issue.
200
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Moreover, Weber addresses the ECJ’s ruling in Gaston Schul201 and distinguishes the application 
of the principle of mutual recognition within the ambit of indirect taxation (VAT). While he 
acknowledges that it is “tempting to directly transpose the [ECJ’s] solution in Gaston Schul to 
direct taxation”, he stresses that the ruling was only made possible by the fact that the “object 
and purpose as well as the most important basic assumptions, general contours and substance of 
the VAT had [already] been harmonized”.202 He stresses that because direct taxation measures of 
the Member States lack any such level of harmonization, the ECJ’s ruling in Gaston Schul 
specifically excludes said measures from subjection to the principle of mutual recognition.
203
 
Still though, and despite his evidencing the ECJ’s cautious approach to the application of the 
mutual recognition to national direct taxation measures, Weber nonetheless concedes that “it is 
not yet clear to what extent the ECJ will apply the case law on…the principle of mutual 
recognition to cases involving national direct tax measures”.204   
Indeed, none of the above criticism or analysis changes the fact that the ECJ appears—
randomly and only at times—to apply a form of mutual recognition in conjunction with its 
utilization of the overall approach to evaluate Member State direct taxation measures. 
Conversely, as is the case in Kerckhaert, the language and substance of the Court’s rulings 
sometimes appear to disregard the recognition of “other” concurrent taxation measures altogether 
and to evaluate direct taxation measures through strict application of the per-country approach. 
Consequently, due to the non-transparent formality of many of the ECJ’s rulings with regard to 
direct taxation measures, whether the overall or per-country approach has actually been utilized 
is often difficult to decipher. In fact, despite AG Geelhoed’s acknowledged preference for the 
overall approach for direct taxation cases, the Court’s discrimination analysis in Kerckhaert is 
essentially void of any substantial analysis of the effect of the concurrent taxation measures’ co-
existence. Differently though, in his opinion preceding the Court’s ruling in Kerckhaert, AG 
Geelhoed clearly engaged in a detailed consideration of the potential effects of the parallel 
application of the concurrent taxation measures.
205
 Through his analysis of both the Belgian and 
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French measures, AG Geelhoed adopted a popular line of argument
206
 which concluded that the 
Belgian taxpayers in Kerckhaert actually paid less tax on their cross-border dividends than 
would have been assessed in a purely internal situation.
207
  Specifically, he stated “the actual 
effect of the operation of the French system was that Belgian-resident shareholders received a 
higher amount in the case of French-source dividends than in the case of exactly the same 
amount of dividends distributed from a Belgian company”.208 Further, he concluded that “the 
actual (favourable) effect of the legislative framework for [the taxpayers] is in my view decisive 
on the facts of the present case”.209 
While this line of argument was not expressly adopted by the Court and its ruling 
depended instead on the comparator issue, Mason argues that the Belgian measure in Kerckhaert 
may nevertheless have violated the free movement of capital through the subjection of cross-
border dividends to greater overall tax than domestic dividends.
210
 Unlike the analysis in AG 
Geelhoed’s opinion which drew conclusions based on the “facts of the present case” and thus 
relied specifically on the measures of Belgium and France, Mason argues that the Belgian 
measure could have been evaluated in light of other, hypothetical measures.
211
 She stresses that 
because the argument that the Belgian measure was discriminatory depended on Belgium’s 
failure to credit foreign withholding taxes,
212
 the Court could have evaluated the Belgian 
measure’s potential treatment of a cross-border dividend distributed not from France but from 
another Member State which did not grant imputation credits to foreign shareholders.
213
 In fact, 
Mason argues, a situation where a source-Member State refuses to issue imputation credits 
actually results in a situation where a Belgian resident taxpayer’s foreign-sourced dividends are 
subjected to significantly greater taxation than purely internal dividends.
214
 Seemingly, 
arguments such as Mason’s above may have impelled the Court to limit its ruling to an 
evaluation of comparators within the ambit of the non-discrimination test. Moreover, had the 
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Court pronounced that a finding of discrimination required that a direct taxation measure 
actually cause a net tax disadvantage, this holding would have unnecessarily handcuffed the 
Court and established an overly narrow concept of tax discrimination.
215
   
As mentioned earlier with regard to the language and substance of the Court’s 
discrimination analysis in Kerckhaert, the ruling appears to depend entirely on an assessment of 
the comparability of the capital movements and/or taxpayers at issue. Relying on the well-
established case law stemming from Schumacker, the applicants sought to establish that 1) the 
income derived from their cross-border capital movement was not comparable to that derived 
from a purely internal situation, and 2) it is discriminatory to impose an identical taxation 
measure both on income that is yet to be taxed and on income that has already been subject to a 
withholding tax. As Snell declares, “the argument was entirely credible, as the Court has 
repeatedly held that the application of the same rule to different situations can be 
discriminatory”.216 Further, Snell criticizes the Court’s stated reasoning as to the comparator 
issue in that: 
The Court simply asserts that the position of the shareholders is not necessarily 
altered in the meaning of the earlier case law by the fact that the income has 
already been taxed in another Member State. This is an entirely inadequate 
response. In fact, it does not deserve to be called reasoning at all, as the Court 
does not offer any reasons, but simply lays down a conclusion without explaining 
how it arrived at it.
217
 
While an array of explanations has been posited to explain the Court’s ruling in this case, a 
recurring consideration is that the Court is cautious to encroach on the autonomy of the Member 
States in the area of direct taxation. Strongly supporting this opinion, for example, are the 
statements of AG Geelhoed as to EU legislature’s role as the proper vehicle for intervention in 
issues of a “systematic nature” or “inherent fiscal-economic policy”.218  
However, the likelihood of political sensitivity cannot be said to be a legal basis which 
inspired the Court’s cautious approach to juridical double taxation in Kerckhaert.219 In fact, the 
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ECJ’s stated reason for caution was that EU law, “in its current state”, lacked “any general 
criteria for the attribution of competence between the Member States in relation to the 
elimination of double taxation”.220 In other words, the Court claimed that the free movement of 
capital could not be applied broadly to juridical double taxation unless the EU legislature were to 
develop binding “guidelines” (e.g., a directive) for the allocation of taxing jurisdiction among the 
Member States.
221
 Indeed, the Court in Kerckhaert proceeded to refer to the very limited number 
of harmonization measures that had actually been adopted at the EU level with regard to the 
elimination of double taxation.
222
 The then-current measures were said to be limited to Council 
Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case 
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (OJ 1990 L 225, p. 6), the 
Convention of 23 July 1990 on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the 
adjustment of profits of associated enterprises (OJ 1990 L 225, p. 10) and Council Directive 
2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (OJ 
2003 L 157, p. 38).
223
 Still, the ECJ’s implication that its ruling was tied to a lack of harmonizing 
legislation fails to recognize that in a number of its most seminal direct taxation cases “the Court 
did not hesitate to divide tax jurisdiction among the Member States, despite the absence of 
Community guidelines”.224 Specifically, Kofler and Mason stress that the Court imposed its 
“own priority rules” as to tax allocation among the Member States “in the areas of personal tax 
benefits, cross-border loss utilization, double utilization of depreciation, indirect taxation, and 
social security”.225 Thus, the ECJ’s self-imposed limited competence to effect new priority rules 
as to juridical double taxation can hardly be considered an inevitable result. Either way, the 
Court’s ruling in Kerckhaert made clear its unwillingness to establish priority rules within the 
ambit of juridical double taxation. Further, despite the dubiousness of the delineation between 
discrimination and disparity in Kerckhaert, the ruling solidified the “new trend”226 in which the 
ECJ’s more lenient treatment of “mere disparities” appears to mask the Court’s hesitancy to 
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utilize negative integration where tax integration should instead be adopted by the Community 
legislature.
227
 
 
PART V – POST-KERCKHAERT PROSPECTS FOR THE RELIEF OF DOUBLE 
TAXATION IN CROSS-BORDER ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  
1. TAX COORDINATION VERSUS TAX HARMONIZATION 
Based on the above analysis of Kerckhaert, there at least appears to be an apprehensive 
consensus that the ECJ cannot and should not utilize negative integration to condemn “non-
discriminatory” / “merely disparate” direct taxation measures even if said measures might result 
in juridical double taxation; and, juridical double taxation as an inevitable result of the 
concurrent direct taxation measures can only be remedied by democratically-chosen, decision-
making bodies such as the Council and the European Parliament.
228
 Still, while extensive 
harmonization or uniformity has been agreed to at the EU level with regard to indirect taxation, a 
relatively limited amount of secondary EU law is capable of affecting national sovereignty in the 
area of direct taxation.
229
 In fact, as Kofler and Tenore explain, “[h]armonization in the field of 
direct taxation is still limited to some directives confined to discrete areas of particular relevance 
to cross-border situations”.230 Through Article 115 TFEU, directives in the field of direct 
taxation can be adopted by unanimous vote for the approximation of such laws, regulations, or 
administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the internal market.
231
 Nevertheless, the requirement of unanimity in the Council, 
coupled with Member State interest in maintaining direct taxation sovereignty, clearly encourages 
deadlock within the legislative process.232 Further, the directives and other pieces of secondary law 
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actually capable of passing muster within the legislative framework of the EU are often lacking 
in effectiveness relative to their stated purposes, scope, or force. Kofler and Tenore state: 
[D]irectives in the direct tax area are the—almost inevitably imperfect—result of 
compromise between the Member States; [and,] as a consequence of this 
bargaining process, their respective objective and subjective scopes are limited, 
they grant general options to Member States, and they even contain express 
permissions for specific Member States to deviate from the directive’s provisions 
to take into account budgetary concerns.
233
 
Thus, with regard to a directive, regulation, or other form of positive integration capable of 
harmonizing the treatment of cross-border economic activity so as to eliminate economic or 
juridical double taxation, the prospect of effective legislation is highly uncertain, at best.  
 Still, as Kemmeren stresses, while the integration of the Member States’ tax systems is a 
prerequisite for the realization of an actual internal market, European-wide harmonization of all 
taxes is neither feasible nor necessary.
234
 Rather, he states that a “sufficient level of coordination 
may be adequate” to remove cross-border tax obstacles that disrupt the internal market.235 In fact, 
Kemmeren’s line of argument parallels AG Geelhoed’s observation in ACT Group Litigation that 
net tax disadvantages due to the concurrent taxation measures of multiple Member States would 
remain inevitable in cross-border economic activity “even if national tax systems were exactly 
the same in design and content”. 236 Kofler and Mason have expounded upon this observation 
and stated directly that double taxation is not a problem that can be cured by harmonization of 
the Member States’ tax laws. Rather, they explain: 
Unlike many tax problems in the European Union, double taxation does not arise 
simply because Member State tax systems are different from each other. Double 
taxation would persist even if all Member States had exactly the same tax laws 
because double taxation arises from the simultaneous assertion of source taxing 
rights by the source country and residence taxing rights by the residence 
country.
237
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Again, aside from a few harmonizing directives, the coordination of concurrent taxation 
measures so as to avoid double taxation has been conducted almost exclusively by means of self-
imposed unilateral limitations on jurisdiction initiated by the Member States as well as by DTCs. 
To avoid negative scrutiny from the ECJ, the direct taxation measures of the Member States must 
simply be non-discriminatory. Thus, in that Member States’ independent techniques to 
coordinate concurrent taxation do not solve all of the double taxation problems which indeed 
arise in practice, both economic as well as juridical double taxation continue to affect the cross-
border economic activity of both individuals and companies.
238
 
Clearly, the ECJ has placed the onus on the Member States to resolve the issue of double 
taxation affecting cross-border economic activity. With regard to the means by which EU-wide 
tax integration is capable of being realized, Kemmeren stresses 1) negative integration, 2) 
positive integration, and 3) tax competition.
239
 The possibility of negative integration within the 
ambit of double taxation is, quite simply, limited by the ECJ’s ruling in Kerckhaert (as well as 
subsequent case law) and the Court’s refusal to remove disparities which manifest as obstacles to 
cross-border economic activity. Similarly, the possibility of positive integration is limited both 
by the Member States’ lack of willingness to subject their national tax autonomies to EU 
harmonization measures as well as the general ineffectiveness of direct taxation directives and 
other legislation capable of clearing the unanimity hurdle. Differently though, with regard to tax 
competition, Kemmeren cites to notable successes such as both Germany (2001) and the United 
Kingdom (2009) switching from an imputation system to a participation exemption so as to have 
their tax systems coordinated with other Member States.
240
 However, tax competition obviously 
can have the opposite effect of coordination where Member States engage in “adversarial” 
competition and, for example, a Member State’s tax system (e.g., low corporate tax rate) is 
purposely designed with the dual intentions of attracting foreign business as well as 
disadvantaging the tax revenues of other Member States.
241
 Further, tax competition is a 
disjointed, time-consuming process with little to no guarantee that Member States will actually 
coordinate their tax systems for the betterment of the internal market. Indeed, none of the above 
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means of tax integration appears ideally suitable or capable of assuring the coordination of 
concurrent taxation measures so as to eliminate double taxation. Additionally, none of these 
means appear capable of satisfying the time-sensitive urgency repeatedly expressed by the EU 
with regard to the removal of tax obstacles to cross-border VC investments.
242
  
2. ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE (AIFMD) & 
EUROPEAN VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS REGULATION (EuVECA) 
Even within the ambit of directives not pertaining to the direct taxation sovereignty of the 
Member States, highly compromised legislation with watered-down effectiveness is, generally, 
not uncommon. Recent products of the EU legislative process are the Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)
243
 and the European Venture Capital Funds Regulation 
(EuVECA Regulation).
244
 The EuVECA Regulation took effect as a complementary piece of 
legislation and to coincide with the implementation of the AIFMD on July 22, 2013. The 
AIFMD, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, was developed under the premise that a 
uniform and comprehensive regulatory framework is necessary to ensure effective monitoring 
and oversight of alternative investment funds (including larger VC funds) in that such funds are 
capable of exposing markets to “systemic risk”.245 Concurrently, the AIFMD provides fund 
managers with a “marketing passport”—or, more accurately, permission to market their funds 
across the EU—in exchange for subjection to “strict rules on transparency and disclosure, 
valuation, risk and liquidity management, the use of leverage, remuneration, conflicts of interest, 
and the acquisition of companies”.246 However, as with the “venture capital exemption” of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the AIFMD exempts certain qualifying VC funds from the need to comply with 
the compulsory demands of the AIFMD.
247
 This exemption is due to the acknowledgment that 1) 
VC funds typically utilize little to no debt and 2) the size of the VC industry is too small to pose 
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systemic risk.
248
 Thus, while a corresponding marketing passport or the designation as a 
“European Venture Capital Fund” is available through the EuVECA Regulation, the passport is 
both entirely voluntary and subject to less onerous rules than the AIFMD.
249
 The EuVECA 
Regulation is applicable on a fund-by-fund basis and the qualifying criteria for the passport 
reflect and promote many of the industry-standard drivers of a “virtuous venture capital 
cycle”.250 For example, to qualify, VC fund managers must be established in the EU with assets 
under management neither in excess of a €500 million threshold nor considered “leveraged” as 
defined in the AIFMD.
251
 Further, a qualifying VC fund must invest at least 70% of its aggregate 
capital contributions and uncalled committed capital in SMEs with fewer than 250 employees, 
annual turnover not exceeding €50 million, and total balance sheet not exceeding €43 million.252 
Potential benefits of the marketing passport available through the EuVECA Regulation 
are predicted to entail decreased costs and increased levels of capital for qualifying funds.
253
 Said 
benefits would derive from the removal of the obligation to comply with the myriad national 
rules (costs) as to marketing funds in differing Member States.
254
 Still, in that the AIFMD and 
EuVECA Regulation are the products of years of debate within the EU institutions between the 
competing ideas of opposing interest groups, a level of skepticism exists as to the effectiveness 
of the legislation in promoting a pan-EU VC industry. For example, during the legislative 
process building-up to the AIFMD and EuVECA Regulation, the European Parliament—based 
on the opinions of the European Central Bank and the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC)—proved to be much more concerned with the regulation of funds and 
markets than with whether the proposed legislation “could harmonize venture capital fundraising 
and, more importantly, spur venture capital investments in emerging growth companies”.255 
Despite the myriad reports,
256
 proposals,
257
 opinions
258
 and the abundance of time and money 
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spent by lawmakers (and policymakers) considering, re-drafting, and finally producing 
legislation, the unfortunate reality is that the end-product is often counterproductive or simply 
ineffective.
259
 Indeed, despite the strong consensus that a pan-EU VC industry requires particular 
taxation measures as well as the elimination of tax obstacles such as double taxation,
260
 the 
EuVECA Regulation is almost completely silent on issues of taxation altogether. Recital 5 refers 
to the Commission Communication of 7 December 2011, entitled “An action plan to improve 
access to finance for SMEs” and the prospect of the Commission completing its examination of 
tax obstacles to cross-border venture capital investments in 2012, with a view to presenting 
solutions in 2013. But, at current, a possible solution has not been presented. 
In fact, prior to the EuVECA Regulation taking effect and with regard to its potential 
effectiveness in driving a pan-EU VC industry, the EESC opined that “the single passport” in no 
way addresses “the problem of cross-border tax obstacles in venture capital”.261 Further, the 
EESC noted that if the Commission failed to address the “main problems” of the VC industry, 
there may be limited interest in a marketing passport.
262
 Still, as to removing tax obstacles from 
cross-border VC investments, there exists a level of restrained optimism that “the European-wide 
regulatory approach to venture capital funds could serve as a good starting point for discussions 
among tax regulators”.263 According to the European Private Equity & Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA), the EuVECA Regulation’s significance (i.e., maybe as not just a marketing 
regulation) within the framework of EU secondary legislation has already been evidenced by 
cross-references to the “European Venture Capital Fund” designation in proposed legislation 
with an impact on venture capital.
264
 Further, EVCA states: 
[I]n its recent proposal on reforms to the structure of EU banks the European 
Commission has proposed an important exemption for venture capital funds, but 
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only if they have the EuVECA designation. If this is accepted by the European 
Parliament and Council of Ministers this could become a powerful precedent.
265
   
Accordingly, if the EuVECA designation is able to develop further into a distinct and widely 
accepted asset class or “fund vehicle” that—as a driver of EU innovation policy—is often 
exempted from EU-wide economic and financial regulation such as the AIFMD, new legislation 
to eliminate cross-border tax obstacles for that same fund vehicle hardly seems improbable. For 
example, it does not seem far-fetched for the EU to develop harmonizing—or at least 
coordinating—measures to eliminate uncertainty as to whether the economic activities of a fund 
manager who has obtained the EuVECA designation will be deemed to have created a permanent 
establishment in a Member State.
266
 Still, clearly, in that “the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality…put severe limitations on the regulatory competences of European 
policymakers, [said principles] are likely to prevent a quick and effective solution to the cross-
border tax issues”.267  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Lisbon Strategy set forth in 2001 entailed the ambitious goal for the EU to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world—an internal market capable 
of sustainable growth with more and better jobs. After a decade of myriad programs and 
initiatives, EU institutions realized that their goals were still very much out of reach and—in 
particular—that policies and efforts to support innovation achieved minimal success.268 Thus, as 
a primary component of the EU’s new EU2020 strategy, said strategy was endowed with a 
dedicated flagship initiative entitled “Innovation Union”. This initiative has led to “a new 
generation of even more ambitious policies, which seem likely to lead to an increase in the 
already egregious levels of public spending”.269 Further, as Granieri and Renda explain, “the 
overall impression gained from an analysis of the recent developments in EU innovation policy 
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is that of a labyrinth, in which finding the right direction becomes almost impossible”.270 And, 
regardless of the best of intentions in their design and implementation, these new innovation 
initiatives appear destined to continue to be “constrained, if not frustrated, by the lack of EU 
competence on issues that still pertain to national governments”.271     
While many day-to-day pronouncements from Silicon Valley leaders stress the libertarian 
view that government intervention is simply an ineffective means of stimulating innovation, 
Lerner stresses that the long history of the VC-industry evidences that “the government’s 
catalyzing role was critical in stimulating the growth” of entrepreneurial ideas, emerging growth 
ventures, and start-ups.
272
 Further, Lerner makes clear: 
Since the 2008–09 global financial crisis, interest among policy makers in 
promoting innovative, high-potential ventures has exploded. The emerging great 
hubs of entrepreneurial activity—like Bangalore, Dubai, Shanghai, Silicon 
Valley, Singapore, and Tel Aviv—bear the unmistakable stamp of the public 
sector. Enlightened government intervention played a key role in each region’s 
emergence. But for each effective government intervention, dozens, even 
hundreds, disappointed, with substantial public spending bearing no fruit.
273
 
In fact, in light of the strict constraints of the subsidiarity principle on the competence of the EU 
in the promotion of innovation, one certainly cannot fault the EU for a lack of effort to promote 
innovative SMEs. While Granieri and Renda describe the EU’s measures to provide financing to 
SMEs as “a quagmire” in their administration,274 the premise of passively matching or 
guaranteeing private investment in innovation can hardly be called baseless.
275
 There is a strong 
consensus that government grants or loans that parallel private investment can drive innovation 
as long as the government does not attempt actively to “choose the winners” and take on the role 
of the VC fund manager as a “highly incentivized financial intermediary”.276 And, indeed, the 
EU has aggressively taken on the role of passive investor through the European Investment Bank 
in providing guarantees and securitizations.
277
 Nevertheless, due to the complexities of 
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supranational coordination and governance of these measures, the relative success and continued 
feasibility of said measures are currently uncertain.
278
    
 Despite the EU’s best efforts and repeatedly demonstrating its awareness of the VC 
industry’s role as the essential link between finance and innovation, the EU’s fragmented internal 
market presents very real issues which frustrate the economies of scale necessary to promote 
pan-EU VC investment and fundraising.
279
 Primary among these issues is the lack of integration 
between the autonomous taxation systems of the differing Member States and the fact that said 
systems are not yet coordinated sufficiently to avoid incidents of double taxation in cross-border 
VC investments. Neither the EU’s secondary legislation nor the ECJ’s case law currently 
evidences a willingness to wield its competence to resolve this lack of tax integration / 
coordination. Again, unless a Member State taxation measure is discriminatory, the ECJ’s case 
law at the intersection of the free movement of capital and national direct taxation measures 
holds that double taxation is merely a net tax disadvantage which results from the disparities 
between differing Member States’ tax systems. While the ECJ was presented with the 
opportunity to rule otherwise in Kerckhaert, the Court avoided the controversy of such a ruling 
in that the EU had failed to establish legislative “guidelines” as to the allocation of taxing 
jurisdiction among the Member States in cases of double taxation. Like a Member State’s request 
for a preliminary ruling, the Court’s ruling in Kerckhaert might be interpreted as a request for 
guidelines so as to enable a different ruling in the future.  Either way, harkening back to its 
traditional role in the development of the free movement of capital, the ECJ in Kerckhaert 
proved to be reluctant to give an answer to a question which raised “issues of a systemic nature”. 
Indeed, the ruling in Kerckhaert evidenced the ECJ’s longstanding consciousness that its 
obligation to liberalize capital movements at the intersection of direct taxation is 1) dependent on 
the Member States’ economic and political goals, and 2) first, and foremost, a matter for EU 
legislators. 
 The AIFMD and EuVECA Regulation are the latest pieces of legislation which might—
or might not—eventually inspire new or amended measures that dare to address the tax obstacles 
to cross-border VC investment in the EU. Despite the anticipation of yet another report from the 
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Commission on the alleviation of said obstacles, the Commission’s competence is limited. In 
fact, the Commission’s competence depends entirely on the collective will(s) of the Member 
States as manifested within the legislative process of the EU. And, in light of the ECJ’s holdings 
in Kerckhaert and subsequent case law, the potential for a robust, EU-wide VC industry will 
depend on the success of future information exchange and education with regard to VC as an 
asset class by and amongst the Member States. In that an EU-wide VC market could only benefit 
the SMEs that drive innovation and the EU economy generally, the Member States can and 
should actively apply themselves to solving the persistent issue of double taxation. 
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